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21 DEC 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DDI Historical Board

SUBJECT : Comments on "The Intelligence Map Programs on
Communist Areas"

1. This manuscript is a competent, though not particularly stimulating, history of the intelligence map program on communist areas. It is in good physical shape. Under the circumstances, I think there are better ways for all concerned to spend their time than to attempt any substantial revision of this paper.

2. There is, however, one brief passage that seems to lack proper historical perspective. Since this will become the official record on the subject, I think some further work is necessary.

3. The passage consists of the first five sentences in the paragraph commencing on the middle of page 53. Each of the three sources cited is a monthly report of the USSR Branch, OBGI. Whereas sources so close to the working level doubtlessly chronicle faithfully the month-to-month activities -- and frustrations -- of the component in question, I think you will agree that they leave something to be desired as a final authority on controversial matters involving another office.

4. The main thrust of this passage unmistakably casts NPIC in the role of a bungler, and responsible for a series of unhappy events which adversely affected the mapping program. Though this may, understandably, have been the parochial view of those in the USSR Branch who were having problems, some of the statements, when incorporated in an office history, become unsupportable or naive. Thus, the statement that "much top-quality film was destroyed and useless materials retained" is clearly a subjective response by thwarted people. Moreover, the time criterion used by NPIC was adopted only after community-wide negotiations and agreement. Though a hardship seems to have been worked on the USSR Branch of OBGI, their quarrel, if any, should be

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with those who represented their interests in the negotiations. Undeniably, competition did develop for use of the remaining copy of film, but NPIC PI's also deplored their inability to get immediately film being used by OBGI. So this approach results in a draw, with no real insight into what really happened. If it can be proved that much top quality film was destroyed, so be it. But it should be clear, I think, that there was adequate evidence to show that any authority used to substantiate such a claim was knowledgeable of and carefully weighed all the facts before coming to such a conclusion.

5. I wish I could throw more light on the subject, but all I can offer after some searching is the attached Xerox copy of an NPIC Notice. I am reluctant at this point to drop everything else and start a major search. I think the Notice will establish the fact that the program was not capricious in its plan or execution. Note especially paragraphs 1,b. and 1,c. Also, note the distribution list, which includes DOD and NSA. Incidentally, at this time, CIA/IAD was the funnel through which formal NPIC contacts and business with other parts of the Agency passed. It would be totally unwarranted, however, to blame IAD; I have no such evidence, and besides, there were many other places where communications could have failed -- even including OBGI itself.

6. I am neither able to confirm nor deny the role of [redacted] now deceased, but I think it doubtful that he spoke for the Center in any decision to give the Geography Division surplus film. On the other hand, I would not be surprised to find that he arranged the exchange on this end of the pipeline once the basic policy decision was made.

7. My purpose in thus challenging the passage in the [redacted] manuscript is not to introduce a strictly parochial counterclaim. Rather, in the absence of definitive documentation, I am simply trying to establish the position that I think the official historical record deserves a more authoritative and objective treatment of this problem. Unfortunately, the NPIC Records Management Officer has died just recently, and [redacted] the Assistant for Operations at the time, is now living in retirement in Florida, with only his personal recollections, which would scarcely provide adequate documentation of what happened. However, since the film disposal problem in all probability is a matter of record in the minutes of COMOR

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and/or the AdCom, these documents and/or the Agency representatives to
these former groups might be able to provide leads for obtaining better
sources of information than those presently provided.

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NPIC Historical Officer

Attachments:

Xerox copy of

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Distribution:

- Copy 1 - Chairman, DDI Historical Board w/atts
- 2 - NPIC Historical Officer w/o atts
- 3&4 - NPIC/ODIR w/o atts

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CENTER ROUTING SLIP

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NPIC Historical Off.

21 DEC 1970

TO	INITIALS	DATE	REMARKS
DIRECTOR			
DEP/DIRECTOR			
EXEC/DIRECTOR	2	12/21	
SPECIAL ASST	3	12/18	Hold
ASST TO DIR	1	12/4	
HISTORIAN	4		1-3 [] recommends that this <u>not</u> go to Mr. Lundahl but that we follow-up with [] next year. Bill
CH/PPBS			
DEP CH/PPBS			
EXO/PPBS			
CH/SS			
DEP CH/SS			
SC & P			
RECORDS MGT			
PERSONNEL			
LOGISTICS			
TRAINING			
SECURITY			
FINANCE			
CH/IEG			
DEP CH/IEG			
EXO/IEG			
CH/PSG			
DEP CH/PSG			
EXO/PSG			
CH/TSG			
DEP CH/TSG			
EXO/TSG			
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CH/DIAXX-4			
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